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ABSTRACT
Delusional mood is a well-recognized psychological state, 
often present in the prodromal stage of schizophrenia. 
Various phenomenological psychopathologists have pro-
posed that delusional mood may not only precede but also 
contribute to the later formation of schizophrenic delusion. 
Hence, understanding experiential abnormalities involved 
with the delusional mood have been considered central for 
the understanding of schizophrenic delusion. Ranging from 
traditional and contemporary phenomenological and neuro-
biological accounts, it has been often mentioned that the 
peculiar affective saliency of the world experience may 
underpin the emergence of delusional mood. In this paper, 
I employ Edmund Husserl’s account of affection and affective 
syntheses to clarify the nature of such an experience and 
illuminate how this experiential abnormality contributes to 
the emergence of the delusional mood. I conclude by relat-
ing the phenomenological account I advance here with 
a neurobiological account of aberrant salience hypothesis 
and chart out a possible way toward mutual enlightenment 
for both approaches.
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Delusional mood is a well-recognized psychological state often present in 
the prodromal stage of schizophrenia. Its notable characteristics include 
several experiential abnormalities. As identified by Karl Jaspers, the first 
characteristic of delusional mood is the global, atmospheric change. The 
sense of uncanniness of the world and the ineffable, oppressive tension that 
“something is going to happen” have been known to pervade and envelop 
a patient’s life (Jaspers, 1997, pp. 98–100). The second characteristic, the 
most extensively studied by the Gestalt School, is the splintering of an object 
phenomenon and the bewildering, enigmatic manifestation of the world 
(Conrad, 1958; Matussek, 1987). An object is no longer perceived as 
a unified, whole object in its meaningful relation to its surrounding envir-
onment, but in its fragmented aspects and its surrounding acquires 
a peculiar saliency (Matussek, 1987, pp. 90–96). The third characteristic is 
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the loss of the familiar, determinate meaning of an object, or its practical 
significance. In this state, “[the patient] does not know any more ‘what it is 
all about’, why the things he encounters are here at all, and what to do with 
them” and the determinate meaning of an object remains “abstract and 
arbitrary” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 136). These experiential abnormalities have been 
proposed to not only precede the development of schizophrenic delusion 
but also “prepare the ground for the entry into a delusional world” (Sass & 
Pienkos, 2013a, p. 642). Hence, the question of how the delusional mood 
emerges has been the central subject of enquiry in the discussion of schizo-
phrenic delusional formation.
So far, it has often been mentioned that the peculiar affective saliency of 
the world experience, whereby every insignificant detail of one’s surround-
ings become conspicuously salient, may involve the emergence of the delu-
sional mood (Conrad, 1958; Jaspers, 1997; Kapur, 2003; Matussek, 1987; 
Sass & Byrom, 2015). This paper employs Husserl’s account of affection to 
illuminate the underlying structure of such an experiential abnormality and 
map out how its structural alteration can implicate the aforementioned 
notable characteristics of the delusional mood. I conclude by relating the 
phenomenological account I propose here with the neurobiological account 
that also posits the affective salience experience as its target phenomenon, 
i.e., aberrant salience hypothesis, and advance a mutual enlightenment 
thesis. My argument proceeds as follows.
I begin by reviewing contemporary accounts of delusional mood. 
Husserl’s phenomenology has been already employed to explain the emer-
gence of the delusional mood. Most notably, Thomas Fuchs (2005) and 
Wiggins et al. (1990) have argued that the disturbance in “temporal synth-
esis” and “Urdoxa” underpins the delusional mood experience. Although 
this is a prevailing account endorsed and developed by various prominent 
figures (Sass & Pienkos, 2013b; Stanghellini et al., 2016), I contest it on the 
grounds that their disturbance results not in delusional mood experience 
but the impossibility in having any experience. Second, I appeal to Husserl’s 
account of affection and affective syntheses (Husserl, 2001). This is to 
develop a new avenue for providing a more detailed and nuanced phenom-
enological account of the delusional mood experience. From the discussion 
of affection and affective syntheses, I glean two conceptual tools necessary 
for providing an alternative account of the delusional mood: affective 
repression and affective propagation. In short, the former regulates the 
prominence of a perceived object and its encompassing context, the latter 
enables the past experiential life of a subject to provide a framework of 
determinate sense and familiarity to the present experience. Third, employ-
ing those concepts, I identify the structural underpinning of delusional 
mood as the failure of affective repression. I argue that this structural 
alteration underpins the affective saliency experience and explicates how 
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such an experiential abnormality further implicates the notable character-
istics of the delusional mood. Fourth, I relate the above finding to the 
aberrant salience hypothesis (Kapur, 2003; Kapur et al., 2005) and advance 
a mutual enlightenment thesis. I tentatively suggest that the neurobiological 
hypothesis can complement the proposed phenomenological account by 
identifying the neurobiological correlate of the failure of affective repres-
sion. In turn, the proposed phenomenological account can complement the 
hypothesis by illuminating how exactly it is that the peculiar affective 
saliency experience, or in neurobiological terms, aberrant salience phenom-
enon, can give rise to the delusional mood experience, and thereby resolving 
its enduring issue concerning the mind-level explanation of the delusional 
mood.
1. Delusional mood, temporality, and Urdoxa
According to Jaspers, schizophrenic delusion often originates from the 
alteration in the form of experience, that is, the manner in which one 
experiences time, the world, others, oneself and objects (Jaspers, 1997, 
pp. 58–59). As the term delusional mood suggests, the alteration Jaspers 
focuses on is the atmospheric change involved in the early stage of schizo-
phrenia. In this state “patients feel uncanny and that there is something 
suspicious afoot [. . .] there is some change which envelops everything with 
a subtle, pervasive and strangely uncertain light” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 98). Not 
surprisingly, a fully formed schizophrenic delusion is often characterized by 
the conviction of being conspired against, surveilled upon, and persecuted. 
In contemporary phenomenological research context, Husserl’s phenomen-
ology has been constantly employed to better clarify the “transformation of 
our total awareness of reality” (Jaspers, 1997, p. 95). Most notably, Fuchs 
(2005) and Wiggins et al. (1990) argue that the delusional mood can be best 
regarded as the result of fundamental disturbance in the way one experi-
ences one self and the world across time, that is, in “temporal synthesis” and 
“Urdoxa”. In the following, I explain these technical concepts, presenting 
both authors’ accounts. I then contest the disturbance claim regarding 
temporal synthesis and Urdoxa. Its rationale is as follows. Temporal synth-
esis and Urdoxa are the precondition of subjective experience. Therefore, 
their breakdown, collapse, fundamental disintegration implies the impossi-
bility in having subjective experience, not delusional mood experience. After 
raising this objection, I chart out an alternative avenue for providing a more 
nuanced account that can accommodate delusional mood experience.
Temporal synthesis, in essence, refers to the automatic, self-intending 
feature of the present consciousness which constitutes the enduring identity 
of a given object and of one self across time (Wiggins et al., 1990, pp. 26–27). 
To take the current perception as an example, the basic idea here is that, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 3
every present moment, one’s consciousness is not only aware of a given 
object (e.g., this computer) but also aware of (or ‘retains’) its own just-past 
consciousness. As such, one can be aware not only that this computer one 
perceives now is the same computer one perceived just before but also that it 
is one’s consciousness that has been enduring, or that it is me who has been 
having this experience (Wiggins et al., 1990, pp. 26–27). Developing this 
understanding, Fuchs brings attention to the cognitive, or to be exact, 
“meaning bestowing” aspect of the temporally unified mental process and 
construes it as “synthetic intentionality” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 134). By high-
lighting the cognitive aspect of synthetic intentionality, Fuchs aims to 
suggest that our perception actively intends or means the object itself, 
such that, say, this computer can be perceived not simply as an object 
whose identity endures across time but also as computer that has 
a practical dealing to oneself, e.g., as an object I can simply take up and 
use it to type this sentence with.
In addition to the synthetic function of consciousness, the researchers 
highlight another dimension of experience which usually remains stable and 
goes unnoticed in everyday life case, that is, the take-for-granted belief in the 
existence of the world and one self, or as Husserl calls it, “Urdoxa” (Wiggins 
et al., 1990, p. 26, 28; Fuchs, 2005, p. 135). The researchers emphasize that 
such a belief is not a belief whose content can be canceled out by some 
corrective experiences. Instead, it is the background belief that enables such 
a canceling out (Wiggins et al., 1990, p. 25; Husserl, 1983, pp. 251–272). For 
instance, the belief one has toward the content of, say, a water bottle and its 
correlating attitude (in Husserlian terms, ‘doxic positionality’), or the cer-
tainty that it is water can change to doubting that it is water as one starts 
drinking its content and tastes its fizziness. In the midst of this alteration, 
one nevertheless does not doubt that it is one self who has been drinking the 
content of the water bottle and that what one is drinking now is from the 
same water bottle one was just drinking from. Against the backdrop of this 
unquestioned certainty, the earlier positionality one took (the certainty that 
it is water) can be altered with respect to corrective experiences (that the 
same “it” is not water but soda). In other words, the unity of identity of 
object and oneself constituted by the temporal synthesis, and the absolute 
certainty one takes in such features, Urdoxa, remains invariant and must be 
so for doxic positionality to alter. Acknowledging this close connection 
between temporal synthesis and Urdoxa, Fuchs suggests that without tem-
poral synthesis, Urdoxa, or “the normal perceptual belief in the existence of 
the world and self” would be “shattered” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 135).
Employing the above understanding, Wiggins and his colleagues argue that 
the initial stage of schizophrenia involves an alteration in what usually 
remains unaltered and invariant: temporal synthesis and Urdoxa (Wiggins 
et al., 1990, p. 28). As a result of the disturbance in the temporal synthesis, the 
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researchers claim that “objects and myself may appear splintered, inchoate, 
and fragmented” (Wiggins et al., 1990, p. 29). A patient of Chapman, describ-
ing this experience of fragmentation and disunity, writes: “Everything I see is 
split up. It’s like a photograph that’s torn to bits and put together again” 
(Chapman, 1966, p. 229). As the unity of identity of an object and self become 
unstable, so too does the Urdoxa. In this state, “the very being of the world 
and self”, the researchers argue, becomes “dubious” and “uncertain” (Wiggins 
et al., 1990, p. 30), eliciting the atmospheric feeling typical of the delusional 
mood (Wiggins et al., 1990, p. 28). Similar to Wiggins and his colleagues’ 
proposal, Fuchs argues that at the onset of schizophrenia, temporal synthesis 
is seriously disturbed to the point of its “fundamental disintegration” (Fuchs, 
2005, p. 136). As a result, an object appears not only fragmented but also as 
meaningless “images”, “surfaces”. In this state, one “does not know any more 
‘what it is all about, why the things he encounters are here at all, and what to 
do with them” (Fuchs, 2005, p. 136). This radical disturbance in temporal 
synthesis, Fuchs argues, further implicates a disturbance in Urdoxa, eliciting 
the pervasive sense of uncanniness and unrealness of the world, characteristic 
of delusional mood (Fuchs, 2005, p. 136).
Although I have focused specifically on Fuchs’ and Wiggins et al.’s 
account here, the disturbance claims with regards to the temporal synthesis 
and Urdoxa is a widely accepted view. Most recently, Sass and Pienkos 
(2013b), and Stanghellini et al. (2016) have proposed that the initial stage of 
schizophrenia involves a “total break down” (Stanghellini et al., 2016, p. 49) 
or “collapse” (Sass & Pienkos, 2013b, p. 140) in temporal synthesis. The 
researchers have proposed that such a disturbance results in the disunity of 
what they call “minimal self” or the basic experiential sense of existing as 
a self-identical subject across time, eliciting the fragmentation experience 
emphasized in Wiggins’ analysis. This radical disturbance in temporal 
synthesis is postulated to further disturb the natural perceptual belief in 
the existence of the world, eliciting the above discussed atmospheric change. 
However, here we must reconsider this prevailing view.
1.1. Temporal synthesis and Urdoxa: Are they disturbed?
As Wiggins and his colleagues suggest, temporal synthesis essentially 
designates the automatic self-intending feature of the present conscious-
ness (Wiggins et al., 1990, p. 27), intending its own temporal phases. 
Since the present consciousness intends its own temporal phases, on 
Husserl’s account, one can immediately be aware not only of the tem-
poral unity of experience but also of such a temporally unified experience 
being given to the subject as one’s own, as my experience (Husserl, 1991, 
pp. 84, 361–363). To cut to the core, as the researchers themselves would 
have claimed, temporal synthesis constitutes the temporal unity of an 
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experience and, in so doing, its first personal givenness as well, thereby 
enabling one to be aware of oneself as the very subject of one’s own 
experience across time, or the “minimal self1”. This is exactly the reason 
that Sass and Pienkos correctly claim that “the microstructure of the 
minimal self or first-personal givenness just is the structure of inner time 
consciousness [temporal synthesis]” (Sass & Pienkos, 2013b, p. 138). 
Therefore, the disturbance in the temporal synthesis is not 
a disturbance in the structure of consciousness that only establishes the 
temporal unity of an experience. The disturbance in temporal synthesis 
just is the severe attenuation, fundamental disintegration, total break-
down, or collapse in the same structure that also enables the first- 
personal presentation of an experience: people with schizophrenia should 
not have had any experience.2 Delusional mood experience as such 
should have been impossible.
Moreover, ‘Urdoxa’, or the passive, taken-for-granted belief in the exis-
tence of the world and one self, seems to remain undisturbed in the delu-
sional mood. Consider the following vignette of Conrad:
He got a peculiar feeling that “something was in the air”; what it was, he could not say 
[. . .] Suddenly, he felt that he was supposed to play some “role” during the night; 
perhaps his peers would come behind him and stamp him with a hammer and sickle. 
So he stayed alert in his bed, watching its immediate surroundings (Conrad, 1958, 
p. 8-9, as translated in Bovet & Parnas, 1993, p. 586).
Had it been that Urdoxa was disturbed – the primary belief upon which 
the doxic positionality can alter as the researchers have claimed – noth-
ing should have been doubted nor affirmed. However, as the self-report 
indicates, although Karl cannot determine what exactly it is that has 
changed thus expressing the kind of ‘dubiousness’ and ‘uncertainty’ the 
researchers identified, he is certain that something is off in the air and 
something is going to happen to him. The implication being that Urdoxa 
still operates as the foundational belief in the existence of the world and 
oneself, providing a background sense that that the world and oneself 
exist. As such, Karl can affirm that something about his surroundings has 
changed and something is going to happen to him. Even in the case 
where the existence of the world and one self is doubted, this doubt has 
to presuppose the certainty in being. If one has no certainty in the 
existence of the world and self whatsoever, or if Urdoxa is shattered, 
one would not be able to doubt their existence. There would be nothing 
to be doubtful of. In other words, the ontological doubt, or “uncertainty” 
and “dubiousness” of the world present in delusional mood, necessitates 
the preservation of ontological certainty, the certainty in being: Urdoxa.
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To clarify, my argument is not that the people with schizophrenia do not 
have the above discussed experiential abnormalities characteristic of delu-
sional mood. I am not making the following argument:
(1) Temporal synthesis and Urdoxa are not disturbed.
(2) Therefore, people with schizophrenia cannot have anomalous experi-
ences characteric of delusional mood.
I am arguing the other way around:
(1) People with schizophrenia have those anomalous experiences char-
acteristic of the delusional mood.
(2) Therefore, the precondition of having an experience, that is, temporal 
synthesis, is not disturbed.
Specifically, with regards to the atmospheric change involved in the 
delusional mood, one can still affirm with certitude that something about 
their world has changed and something is going to happen to them. 
Therefore, the precondition of such an affirmation, Urdoxa, is not dis-
turbed. My argument is leveled at the thus far provided 
a phenomenological explanation of the delusional mood – the claim that 
the disturbance in temporal synthesis and Urdoxa underpins its emergence. 
not at its explanandum, as this phenomenological explanation is too radical 
to accommodate the delusion mood experience.
For the present purpose of argument, we should acknowledge that 
Husserl’s account of temporal synthesis and Urdoxa was only the first yet 
fundamental step toward his systematic inquiry into human subjectivity 
(Husserl, 2001, pp. 170–171). They take the “A” of the “ABCs” of phenom-
enology as they are “the basic, essential conditions of the possibility of 
subjectivity itself” (Husserl, 2001, p. 169), without which no subjective 
experience as such is possible. In contrast to the emphasis laid on the 
temporal form of experience, in the “BCs”3 of his phenomenology, so to 
say, Husserl concerns with “the syntheses concerning the content that 
extends beyond a transcendental synthesis of time” (Husserl, 2001, p. 171, 
italics added), i.e., affective syntheses. Briefly put, these associations enable 
one to perceive an object against the backdrop of its encompassing context 
and interact with the world as a historical subject, as a subject whose past 
experiential life constantly informs and contextualizes one’s life and imbues 
it with habitual expectation. Going back to the dialectic of the argument, 
since those associations are primarily concerned with the association of 
experiential content, not the temporal form of experience, their alteration 
would not necessarily implicate the impossibility of subjective experience. 
Instead, it would implicate a certain alteration in the affective dimension, 
that is to say, in the way one finds the world as a living, historical subject. 
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Therefore, it would provide us a new avenue of explaining the delusional 
mood, without having to posit that Urdoxa and temporal synthesis, which 
are the precondition of having an experience, are fundamentally disturbed.
Approaching delusional mood from its affective dimension can further 
help us clarify the nature of the peculiar affective salience experience so 
often mentioned in both phenomenological and neurobiological analyses of 
the delusional mood (Conrad, 1958; Jaspers, 1997; Kapur, 2003; Matussek, 
1987; Sass & Byrom, 2015). This experience refers to the state in which 
insignificant details of one’s surroundings become conspicuously salient, 
eliciting the feeling that somehow everything “turns around” or “looks at” 
an afflicted individual (Conrad, 1958, p. 161; as translated in Mishara, 2010, 
p. 10). By employing the concept of affective syntheses, I aim to illuminate 
the underlying structure of such an experiential abnormality and map out 
how its structural alteration can further implicate the above-discussed 
notable characteristics of the delusional mood. To carry out this task, in 
the following I discuss the conceptual tool necessary for the analysis of the 
delusional mood: affective syntheses.
2. Affective syntheses overview
Affective syntheses can be categorized into primordial, reproductive, and 
anticipatory association.4 In essence, primordial association is responsible 
for the unity formation of sense data and object constitution. Reproductive 
association enables the lived past experience of a subject to constantly 
inform and contextualize the present perception of a subject. Anticipatory 
association, as founded upon reproductive association, establishes habitual 
expectation that guides one’s everyday life interaction with the world. In the 
following, I detail these syntheses and glean the following two structural 
moments of consciousness from the discussion of primordial association 
and reproductive association: affective repression and affective propagation. 
The first will be necessary for the inquiry into the splintering of an object 
phenomenon and the bewildering, enigmatic manifestation of the world, the 
latter for the loss of the determinate, familiar meaning of an object and the 
global sense of uncanniness and the intoxicated anticipation that “some-
thing” is going to happen.
2.1. Primordial association
As a type of experiential content association, primordial association is 
responsible for the unity formation of ‘what’ one primarily experience 
through one’s bodily organs, i.e., sensory data, and establishes the phenom-
enon of “affection” (Husserl, 2001, pp. 176–196). As opposed to the every-
day life usage of the term affection suggests, on Husserl’s account, it does 
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not strictly refer to emotion but the intrinsic impressional, receptive char-
acter of experience. In Husserl’s term, “By affection we understand the allure 
given to consciousness the peculiar pull that an object [immanent sense 
data5] given to consciousness exercises on the ego” (Husserl, 2001, p. 196). 
Affection is a term reserved to designate the constant interaction between 
the “alluring” or “pulling” sensorial unity and the consciousness “pulled” 
into and “turned towards” it (Husserl, 2001, p. 196). By construing sense 
data as an affective sensorial unity, Husserl highlights that perception of an 
object always involves an interplay between the sensorial unity that passively 
solicits one’s attention and the consciousness that actively responds to and 
turns toward such an attraction. Husserl contends that it is through such an 
interplay what makes one to turn toward, an affectively prominent sound 
can be given to oneself as a concrete, phenomenologically rich object, say, as 
the sound of a passing car outside (Husserl, 2001, p. 210). In short, affection 
is the precondition for the perception of an object. In what follows, 
I contrast two types of prominences of sensorial unity which pull us in 
(henceforth affective pull) and identify the phenomenon of “affective repres-
sion”. This will be necessary for our analysis of the splintering of an object 
phenomenon and the bewildering, enigmatic manifestation of the world.
The first type of affective pull is the one whose relative intensity is strong 
enough to trigger the actual state of affection or make one turn toward it and 
grasp it as the direct object of perception (Husserl, 2001, p. 210, 1973, 
p. 108). A screaming sound, for instance, in the context of the general 
acoustic context of this building would belong to this type. In contrast, 
the second type of affective pull is the one whose relative intensity is not 
strong enough to yield the actual affection. Say, the general acoustics of this 
building, the smell of this room, the color of this desk etc. would belong to 
this type. Since the intensity of these pulls is weak compared to that of 
screaming and thus does not trigger actual affection, they are not appre-
hended as the direct object of perception. Instead, Husserl suggests that they 
are immediately experienced in their sensible organization as the surround-
ing environment of the apprehended particular object (Husserl, 2001, pp. -
196–197, 201–203).
Important to our analysis, Husserl argues that what determines the 
intensity of affective pull is nothing but the dynamic interplay between 
the pulls themselves (Husserl, 2001, pp. 197–198). The intensity of the 
screaming sound is stronger than that of other pulls not because its 
intrinsic nature determines it to be so. Instead, it can be stronger than 
that of other pulls because, as it starts to become prominent, it represses 
the intensity of other pulls that has thus far attracted one’s attention 
(Husserl, 2001, p. 197). As such, when I hear someone screaming, I can 
immediately (and quite literally) turn my head toward it without having 
to have my attention kept being captivated by this computer. Generally 
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put, it is thanks to such an affective repression, when a relatively promi-
nent affective pull triggers actual affection and enables one to attentively 
grasp it as an object, the intensity of other pulls can be sensibly regulated. 
So that, to use an everyday life example, when I turn toward this com-
puter and apprehend it as the direct object of my perception, the intensity 
of other pulls (e.g., that of its surrounding object, the lighting of this 
room, the sound of a passing car outside, etc.) do not all become 
prominent but experienced as the general background context of this 
computer. Therefore, a certain alteration in the affective repression would 
implicate dysregulation in the affective prominence that solicits one’s 
attention. This dysregulation would entail the prominence of what 
usually remains unnoticed and a certain alteration in the experiential 
distinction between perceived particular object and its encompassing 
context.
2.2. Reproductive association
Reproductive association, in essence, enables a subject’s past experiential life 
to constantly inform and contextualize his present experiential life. In the 
following, I discuss this association with respect to its structural moment in 
virtue of which the past experience can be implied in the present experience, 
i.e., affective propagation. This will be necessary for our analysis of the loss 
of the meaning of an object and the pervasive sense of uncanniness of the 
world.
In the above, I have suggested that in the state of actual affection we 
turn toward the pull whose prominence is relatively strong. Husserl 
suggests that when one turns toward the pull and attentively grasps it as 
an object, one gets to know about the grasped object “more closely” and 
also of our self:
It is a pull that is relaxed when the ego turns toward it attentively, and progress from 
here, striving towards self-giving intuition, disclosing more and more of the self and 
the object, this striving towards an aspect of knowledge, towards a precise view of the 
object. (Husserl, 2001, p. 196)
The knowledge acquired from this relaxation of the pull (or turning toward 
the affective pull) is the everyday life, taken-for-granted self and object 
knowledge. The knowledge that, to put it in the broadest sense, I have 
a body capable of responding to the affective pull exercised by an object 
and that an object given to me is an object I can respond to and engage with. 
The affectively prominent present experience and the knowledge acquired 
therein, Husserl suggests, gradually lose their intensity as they slip away into 
the past and constitute the historicity of a subject, or “the affective past 
horizon” (Husserl, 2001, p. 204).
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Relevant to our analysis, Husserl argues that the affective past horizon can 
inform and contextualize the present perception via affective propagation that 
constantly emanates from the present to the similar past experience (Husserl, 
2001, p. 189). The basic idea here is that the affective pull that triggers actual 
affection does not simply attract one’s attention to the object perceived in the 
present moment. Instead, it also travels toward the affective past horizon and 
calls to attention or “awakens” the similar past experience whose affective 
intensity is lost (Husserl, 2001, pp. 222–224). To take the present perception 
as an example, the affective pull of this computer propagates toward the 
sedimented similar past experience wherein I perceived and used a computer 
before. Through such propagation, Husserl argues, the past experience and the 
common-sense knowledge acquired therein can inform (or “impart” or “sketch 
in”) its determinate, articulate sense to the present perception (Husserl, 2001, 
pp. 44, 224). So that, to stick to the example, this computer can appear to me as 
an object with its determinate, familiar meaning, as an object I can use to type 
this paper with. Husserl contends that this affective propagation is “constantly 
at work” (Husserl, 2001, p. 206) and enables the past experiences of a subject to 
be always-already “implied in the background consciousness, in the non-living 
form” (Husserl, 2001, p. 228), thereby providing a framework of determinate 
sense and familiarity to the present experiential life. Therefore, a certain altera-
tion in affective propagation would implicate a change in the meaning mani-
festation of an object and the way one perceives the world as a familiar place.
2.3. Anticipatory association
Anticipatory association imbues the present perceptual experience with 
habitual expectations, enabling one to anticipate with a determinate sense 
how the present perception and the perceptual object will continue to 
unfold in the following moment (Husserl, 2001, pp. 139–140, 424). 
Habitual expectation essentially refers to the anticipatory aspect of our 
present perception that takes the form of certainty. For instance, when 
I perceive a chair, I anticipate with certainty that if I turn the chair around 
I will be able to see its back, that if I attempt to sit on the chair my bodily 
capacity will not fail and that the chair will be used as an object I can sit on, 
etc. This anticipation involved in the present perception can take such 
a form of certainty because, simply put, I have used chairs for many years. 
To put it otherwise, the determinate, articulate sense the anticipatory aspect 
of our perception has, the anticipatory certainty that I will be able to sit on 
the chair, is the one imparted from the affective past horizon via affective 
propagation (Husserl, 2001, pp. 424, 235). Therefore, a certain alteration in 
the affective propagation, in virtue of which the past experience can inform 
and contextualize the living present, would also implicate a radical altera-
tion in the anticipatory style of perception.
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2.4. Summary
So far, I have examined three different types of affective syntheses with 
respect to their structural moments: affective repression and affective pro-
pagation. In essence, affective repression enables one to turn toward 
a relatively prominent affective pull and attentively grasp it as an object 
with respect to its surrounding context. Affective propagation, in turn, 
enables one to turn toward an affectively prominent pull as a historical 
subject, whose past experiences constantly provide a framework of determi-
nate sense and familiarity to the present experiential life and establishes 
habitual expectation. Below, I employ these concepts to provide a detailed 
phenomenological account of the delusional mood. I argue that firstly in the 
state of the delusional mood, there occurs the failure of affective repression 
whereby every experienced feature of an object and objects themselves 
become prominent. I demonstrate how this affective dysregulation experi-
ence can manifest in the form of the splintering of an object phenomenon 
and the bewildering enigmatic manifestation of the world. Afterward, 
I argue that the failure of affective repression adds something entirely new 
or bestows an alien affective prominence to the present experiential life that 
cannot be adequately accommodated by the affective past horizon. I then 
show how this phenomenological abnormality manifests itself as the loss of 
the determinate, familiar meaning of an object and the pervasive sense of 
uncanniness of the world and that of intoxicated anticipation. I conclude by 
relating this finding to the neurobiological explanation of the delusional 
mood, namely aberrant salience hypothesis, and sketch out a possible way 
toward the mutual enlightenment of both approaches.
3.1. Delusional mood: The bewildering, enigmatic manifestation of the 
world
Let us begin with the splintering of an object phenomenon. Consider the 
following self-reports. A patient of Chapman writes: “If I look at my watch, 
I see the watch, watch strap, face, hands, and so on, then I have to get to put 
these together into one piece” (Chapman, 1966, p. 229). Renee reports 
a similar sort of experience: “For I saw the individual features of her face, 
the teeth, then the nose, then the cheeks, the one eye and the other” 
(Sechehaye, 1970, p. 51). In the above discussion of affective repression, 
I have suggested that in everyday life case, if, say, the color of a door attracts 
one’s attention and thus enables one to turn toward and attentively grasp it 
as the physical quality of the door, that color normally represses the promi-
nence of other experienced features of the door. So that its other features, 
say, the contour, its size, etc., do not all become prominent and all atten-
tively grasped as individual objects of perception. However, in the state of 
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delusional mood, the affectively prominent experienced features of an object 
seem to no longer repress but bolster the prominence of other experienced 
features.6 Kapur details such an experience with the following self-reports: 
“my senses were sharpened. I became fascinated by the little insignificant 
things around me”, “Sights and sounds possessed a keenness that he had 
never experienced before”, “my senses seem alive . . . Things seemed clearcut, 
I noticed things that I had never noticed before”, “It was as if parts of my 
brain awoke, which had been dormant” (Kapur, 2003, p. 15, italics added). 
In other words, as all of the experienced features of a given object become 
prominent, an afflicted individual feels as though one’s sensory experience is 
“alive”, “keen”, “heightened”, and those affectively prominent individual 
features are, in turn, attentively grasped and perceived as individuated and 
distinct parts of a given object, eliciting the splintering of an object 
phenomenon.
This affective repression failure may further implicate perceptual field 
disturbance whereby perceived surroundings look fragmented and ‘turned 
towards’ an afflicted individual. If affective repression fails such that an 
affectively prominent object no longer represses but bolster the promi-
nence of the surrounding objects, the surrounding objects will be no 
longer perceived as such, as constituting the background context of 
a perceived particular object. Instead, they will be perceived as a set of 
individual objects in themselves. Recounting this kind of experience, 
Renee writes: “I heard the street noises – a trolley passing, people talking, 
a horse neighing, a horn sounding, each detached, immovable, separated 
from its source, without meaning” (Sechehaye, 1970, p. 29). Mattusek’s 
patient similarly reports: “I only saw fragments: a few people, a kiosk, 
a house [. . .] They did not stand together in an overall context, and I saw 
them as meaningless details” (Matussek, 1987, p. 92). In other words, as 
every object that constitutes one’s perceptual field becomes affectively 
prominent, those objects are, in turn, perceived as a collection of indivi-
dual objects in itself, isolated, cut off from each other, no longer standing 
in meaningful relation to one another (Matussek, 1987, p. 92). 
Correlatively, as every object that constitutes one’s perceptual field 
becomes affectively prominent and invites one’s attentive regards, an 
afflicted individual simultaneously feels as though everything somehow 
‘turns around’ or ‘looks at’ him/her. Renee, recounting on the encounter 
she had with her friend in which her friend’s individual facial features 
captivated her attention, writes that she “sees” not only her friend’s 
“brown eyes” but also her “shining white teeth looking at” her 
(Sechehaye, 1970, p. 37). Detailing this sort of experience, Conrad docu-
ments that one of his patients feels wherever his “glance falls, every 
“component of his experiential field” appears to stand in a special relation 
to him and “everything becomes conspicuously salient” (Conrad, 1958, 
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p. 161; as translated in Mishara, 2010, p. 10). In other words, correlative to 
the perceptual object abnormality wherein certain aspects of an object (or 
objects) acquire unusual prominence, there belongs a subjective side or 
perceptual act abnormality wherein one’s attention is involuntarily capti-
vated by such a prominence and feels as though something significant is 
weighted by it – as opposed to simply ignoring such prominence.7
In sum, in the state of delusional mood, there seems to occur the failure of 
affective repression whereby an affectively prominent feature of a given 
object or an object itself no longer represses but bolsters the prominence 
of other affective pulls. The prominence of which, in turn, is attentively 
grasped and perceived as distinct, accentuated features of a given object (for 
the splintering of an object phenomenon) and/or as an object in itself, 
isolated from its background context (for the perceptual field disturbance). 
And that same affective prominence is felt by an afflicted individual as if one 
has become the center of the attention of the world. The world, therefore, 
confronts an afflicted individual as an enigmatic place that constantly invites 
and allures one’s attentive regards.
3.2. Delusional mood: The loss of the determinate, familiar meaning of an 
object
The above-discussed disturbance in perceiving an object and its surround-
ing context has been known to accompany the loss of the meaning of an 
object. The perplexing characteristic of this meaning disturbance is that an 
afflicted individual can still identify a perceived object, say a cup as a “cup”, 
and recall and articulate its practical significance, that it is an object to drink 
from (Fuchs, 2005, pp.136). However, at the same time, afflicted individuals 
report the unfamiliarity and the loss of its meaning:
I attempted to escape their hold by calling out their names. I said, “chair, jug, table, it 
is a chair” [. . .] I saw things, smooth as metal, so cut off, so detached from each other, 
so illuminated and tense that they filled me with terror. When, for example, I looked 
at a chair or a jug, I thought of not their use or function– a jug as something to hold 
and milk, a chair not as something to sit in– but as having lost their meanings, 
functions, and their names, they become “things” and began to take on their life, to 
exist (Sechehaye, 1970, pp. 55-56).
I have argued above that the failure of affective repression intensifies the 
prominence of every experienced feature of a given object and/or objects 
themselves, such that each feature is individually apprehended as accentu-
ated parts of the perceived object and/or as individual objects themselves 
that seem isolated from its surrounding context. This affective prominence 
dysregulation seems to underpin the above-described anomalous experience 
whereby Renee saw objects as “alive” and “saw things, smooth as metal, so 
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cut off, so detached from each other, so illuminated and tense”. Let us here 
further specify the nature of the failure of affective repression to system-
atically account for the meaning disturbance.
Firstly, as the self-reports indicate, the failure of affective repression does 
not split a perceived object into two different types: one that is given in its 
unity and the other that is given in its fragmentation. Had such been the 
case, the affectively prominent parts of an object would have been perceived 
as a collection of distinct objects in their own right, not as fragmentations of 
an object. Although Renee reports that objects appeared to her as cut off 
from one another, they were nevertheless still perceived as a single, distinct 
object. Even when she was describing the fragmentation experience she still 
saw “the teeth, the nose, the cheeks, the one eye and the other” as those of 
her friend’s face. Similarly, Chapman’s patient could still identify the frag-
mented aspects of a watch, as “watch strap”, “face”, “hands”, and so on. In 
other words, the apprehended individual features of an object are still 
perceived as parts of a single object, albeit accentuated and distinct. The 
implication being that for any given object(s), the failure of affective repres-
sion intensifies the affective prominence of the experienced features of one 
and the same object, and those prominent features are apprehended as 
individuated and accentuated aspects of a single object.
Secondly, in 2.3. I argued that the past experience of a subject and the 
commonsensical, everyday life knowledge acquired therein is sedimented 
into the affective past horizon and constantly informs and contextualizes the 
subject’s present perception. This is made possible by the affective propaga-
tion that continuously emanates from the present perception to the sedi-
mented similar past experience. Similarly, in the state of delusional mood, 
the affective force of the perception that presents a given object as a single 
object, say a cup as a cup, still propagates toward the affective past horizon 
and awakens the similar past experience and the knowledge acquired 
therein, thereby enabling one to perceive it as a familiar object whose 
name one can recall and articulate its practical significance. However, the 
affective force of the same perception that presents the same object at its 
intense vivacity has no similar past experience to propagate toward. Within 
the affective past horizon, there just is no similar past experience in which 
every experienced feature of an object had become prominent and imposed 
its tantalizing vivacity on the subject. Recall: “my senses were sharpened. 
I became fascinated by the little significant things around me”, “Sights and 
sounds possessed a keenness that he had never experienced before”, “my 
senses seem alive. Things seemed clear-cut, I noticed things that I had never 
noticed before”, “It was as if parts of my brain awoke, which had been 
dormant” (Kapur, 2003, p. 15, italics added). In other words, the failure of 
affective repression adds something entirely new or bestows an alien affec-
tive prominence to the living present that cannot be adequately 
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accommodated by the affective past horizon. Given the affective propaga-
tion fails with respect to this alien prominence exercised by the very same 
object that appears familiar, it follows that the perceived object will also 
paradoxically appear to oneself as an unfamiliar object, as an object whose 
precise meaning remains to be determined. In simple terms, the problem 
that underlies the meaning disturbance is not that an afflicted individual 
completely forgets the name, or the everyday life use of a given object. 
A person knows what a given object is, say, a cup is an object to drink from. 
The problem is that an afflicted individual perceives alien something more in 
a given familiar object that simply goes beyond the scope of what one 
already knows about the object.
This may closely correspond to David Hemsley’s cognitive model of 
schizophrenia (Hemsley, 2005a, 2005b; Hemsley & Garety, 1986). As 
opposed to the total loss of past experiences and previously acquired 
perceptual knowledge, this model postulates that in the early stage of 
schizophrenia, impairment occurs in the “rapid and automatic assessment 
of the significance or lack of significance” (Hemsley, 2005a, p. 979), eliciting 
the above-discussed anomalous experience whereby every insignificant 
detail of one’s surrounding becomes conspicuously salient. It has been 
further postulated that such an alien experience cannot be adequately 
processed by the stored memories of past experiences and perceptual knowl-
edge (Hemsley & Garety, 1986, p. 54; Hemsley, 2005a, p. 979, 2005b, p. 48), 
leading to the experience wherein a familiar, everyday life object appear 
unfamiliar, as having acquired “properties different from those that exist 
when the normal contextual influences are operative” (Hemsley, 
2005b, p. 47).
To put it in phenomenological terms, the affective force of the present 
perception still propagates toward the affective past horizon and awakens 
the past experience and previously acquired knowledge. However, the 
awakened past experience and knowledge, which still enable one to perceive 
a given object, cannot adequately inform and contextualize the peculiar 
affective prominence exercised by the object. Bluntly put, the perceptual 
knowledge that “a cup is an object to drink from” cannot explain just exactly 
why it is that every individual feature of a perceived cup, its lip shape, color, 
crack, handle, etc. have become prominent and captivate one’s attention. 
Therefore, a perceived object not only appears to oneself as a familiar object 
whose name and practical significance one can recall and articulate, as “a 
chair”, “a jug”, “a table”, etc. The same object also simultaneously appears as 
“alive”, “smooth as metal, so cut off, so detached from each other so 
illuminate and tense” whose precise meaning is yet-to-be-determined, as 
an indeterminate, unfamiliar object. With this understanding in mind, let us 
now move on to the final characteristic of the delusional mood, the global 
sense of uncanniness and intoxicated anticipation.
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3.3. Delusional mood: The pervasive sense of uncanniness and intoxicated 
anticipation
Consider the following vignette of Jaspers:
Something must be going on; the world is changing, a new era is starting. Lights are 
bewitched and will not burn [. . .] the house-signs are crooked, the streets look 
suspicious; everything happens so quickly. The dog scratches oddly at the door. “I 
noticed particularly” is the constant remark these patients make, though they cannot 
say why they take such a particular note of things nor what it is they suspect. (Jaspers, 
1997, p. 100)
In 3.1, I argued that the failure of affective repression underpins the affective 
dysregulation experience wherein every object that constitutes one’s per-
ceptual field becomes prominent and allures one’s attention to its individual 
features and to the individual object itself. In the case of Jaspers’ patient, this 
affective dysregulation manifests itself in the form of constantly noticing 
every detail of one’s surroundings (hence the constant remark of “I noticed 
particularly”). As the self-reports indicate in this state, one can still perceive 
a given object as an object as such, a dog as a dog, a candle as a candle, etc., 
and one’s surroundings as having been perceived before but somewhat 
different. Meaning, the affective force of the present perception still propa-
gates toward the past experiences whereby one perceived given objects and 
their surroundings. In the above, I specified that the failure of affective 
repression bestows an alien affective prominence to the present perception. 
To go back to the case of Jasper’s patient, a dog or a candle not only appear 
to oneself as mundane, familiar objects but also as something that constantly 
allure one’s attention to insignificant details― for the case of the dog, to the 
way it scratches the door, and for the candle, to its flame that seems 
bewitched. This ‘added on’ affective prominence, I have argued, cannot be 
adequately informed and contextualized by the awakened past lived experi-
ence and prior knowledge, hence Jasper’s comment that afflicted individuals 
“cannot say why they take such a particular note of things nor what it is they 
suspect”. In other words, the affective prominence of the perceived familiar 
surroundings and objects therein not only attracts one’s attention to mean-
ingless details but that very attraction or allure is felt as an unfamiliar and 
indeterminate phenomenon. Therefore, not only not does an afflicted indi-
vidual perceive his surroundings as a familiar environment but he also 
simultaneously experiences that “something” is different, “something” has 
changed, experiencing indeterminate unfamiliarity from the very same 
environment he finds familiar or, by definition, uncanniness.
This affective dysregulation experience can further radically alter the 
anticipatory aspect of perception. In 2.3, I argued that the habitual expecta-
tion that one takes for granted in everyday life interaction with the world is 
founded upon the subject’s past experiences. To be specific, the affective 
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propagation that emanates from the living present toward the sediment 
lived past experiences and perceptual knowledge acquired therein deter-
mines the content of habitual expectation to a certain extent. In simple 
terms, thanks to my past experiences, I anticipate not anything at all but 
with certainty that, say, the glass will be shattered if dropped, that I will see 
the backside of the chair if I turn it around, etc. However, if affective 
repression fails such that it bestows an alien affective prominence to the 
living present that cannot be adequately accommodated by the affective past 
horizon, the content of habitual expectation will be radically underdeter-
mined. Correlatively, as its content remains underdetermined, the percep-
tual expectation will no longer take the form of habitual certainty but that of 
dubiousness and uncertainty, hence eliciting the intoxicated anticipation or 
the oppressive tension that “something” must be going on, “something” is 
going to happen.
3.4. Summary
So far, I have examined delusional mood experience from its affective 
dimension. In contrast to the prevailing account that zeros in on the 
fundamental structure of subjectivity, I have shifted the focus of inquiry to 
the affective nature of delusional mood. This was to provide 
a phenomenological account that can accommodate the intricate nature of 
the delusional mood without having to posit that the basic, necessary 
constitutive dimension or the very precondition of having an experience is 
broken down, collapsed, fundamentally disintegrated, or shattered. The 
central tenet of the proposed account is the following: the failure of affective 
repression underpins the experience whereby every feature of an object (or 
objects) becomes prominent and captivates one’s attention (viz. affective 
dysregulation experience). This experience, as demonstrated above, under-
pins the characteristic features of delusional mood. Of interest, this kind of 
experience has been also the target phenomenon for one of the most 
enduring neurobiological hypotheses, i.e., aberrant salience hypothesis. In 
the following, I conclude by relating this finding to a neurobiological 
account and suggest that exchanges between these two approaches may be 
possible and further points to mutual enlightenment for both approaches.
4. Conclusion: A possible mutual enlightenment
Aberrant salience hypothesis (Kapur, 2003; Kapur et al., 2005) postulates 
that the early stage of schizophrenia involves elevated presynaptic striatal 
and subcortical dopamine synthesis and release capacity (Howes & Kapur, 
2009, p. 551). This dopaminergic dysfunction has been known to cause the 
“aberrant salience” phenomenon, whereby insignificant details of one’s 
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experience acquire salience and captivate one’s attention (Kapur, 2003; 
Kapur et al., 2005). The phenomenological equivalent of which is the above- 
discussed affective dysregulation experience. This neurobiological account 
may serve to corroborate the phenomenological analysis I have put forward 
by identifying the neurobiological correlate of affective repression failure as 
dopaminergic dysfunction. In turn, the proposed phenomenological analy-
sis may serve to complement the hypothesis by providing a more detailed 
mind-level explanation of the delusional mood.
As pointed out by Mario Maj in the recent review of the hypothesis, the 
experiences described under the heading of aberrant salience only share 
a partial commonality with those described for delusional mood by Jaspers 
and other psychopathologists (Maj, 2013, p. 234). The aberrant salience, or 
as Maj terms it “heightened intensity of perception”, is not the only experi-
ential abnormality present in the delusional mood. As has been discussed so 
far with reference to the traditional phenomenological accounts, delusional 
mood is also characterized with the meaning disturbance and the global 
atmospheric shift (Maj, 2013, p. 234). In this light, Aaron Mishara and Paolo 
Fusar-poli claim: “How do the dopaminergic alterations affect the creation 
of a “new (psychotic) world”? There remains an explanatory gap between 
what we know about the neurobiology of early psychosis and what we 
understand about its subjective psychopathological experience” (Mishara 
& Fusar-Poli, 2013, p. 284). In simple terms, the question that has to be 
answered at the mind level for a more robust neurobiological explanation is: 
How does one go from having “heightened intensity of perception” to 
having a full-blown delusional mood experience? The phenomenological 
analysis I have advanced can help resolve this issue.
In the above, I argued that in the delusion mood there occurs the failure 
of affective repression whereby every experienced feature of a given object/ 
objects become prominent, eliciting the affective dysregulation experience. 
In clarifying affective repression failure, I have argued that such a structural 
alteration bestows an alien affective prominence to the present perception 
that cannot be adequately accommodated by the affective past horizon. If 
the affective dysregulation experience can be identified with aberrant sal-
ience phenomenon, then it can be reasonably postulated that aberrant 
salience experience is not merely a heightened intensity of perception 
whereby one notices insignificant detail of one’s surroundings. Instead, it 
is the generative disturbance that globally challenges the contextualization 
of the present perception with the sedimented past experience. The phe-
nomenological abnormality of which underpins the characteristic features 
of the delusional mood.
If this is somewhere along the right lines, then it can be reasonably 
postulated that the aberrant salience experience necessarily implicates the 
meaning disturbance and the atmospheric change involved with the 
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delusional mood. If this mind-level implication holds, then it may be provi-
sionally hypothesized that the dopaminergic dysfunction causes not only 
aberrant salience experience but also, by transitivity, the disturbance in the 
meaning manifestation of an object and the atmospheric change. In neuro-
biological terms, the dopaminergic dysfunction in the limbic areas (to be 
specific, amygdala and hippocampus) can be postulated to disturb the activa-
tion of appropriate stored context material from the long-term memory 
(MacLean, 1970; Pankow et al., 2012) for the meaning disturbance. This 
long-term memory deficit may be hypothesized to further implicate the 
disturbance in the generation of appropriate habitual expectancies (Corlett 
et al., 2010; Gray et al., 1991; Hemsley & Garety, 1986) to accommodate the 
global atmospheric change. In such a way, the phenomenologically informed 
neurobiological analysis can aim for a more detailed explanation of the 
delusional mood. Of course, there is much more to be said, and this is only 
a speculative outline. However, I have attempted to show that exchanges 
between phenomenological and neurobiological approaches may be possible 
and have sketched out what these exchanges would amount to, by providing 
a phenomenological account of the delusional mood experience.
Notes
1. “Inner consciousness”, in Husserl’s term (Husserl, 2001, p. 607).
2. I do not exclude the possibility that temporal synthesis can be disturbed. Another 
much-neglected aspect of the temporal synthesis is the affective modification carried 
out by retention, whereby the affective intensity of the retained just-past conscious-
ness is constantly diminished (Husserl, 2001, pp. 217-221). ‘Disturbance’ may be 
attributed to affective modification as it is responsible for the temporal unity of 
experience, not, in its final analysis, the constitution of the formal identity of the 
stream of consciousness, i.e., its first-personal givenness (Husserl, 2001, p. 171, 173, 
1973, pp. 177-178). Affective modification disruption claim may better accommodate 
the anomalous temporal and self experience present in schizophrenia (e.g., time stop, 
ante-festum, déjà vu/vécu, and time fragmentation). For a more elaborate discussion 
of the raised objection and its implication in the analysis of self-disorder present in 
schizophrenia, see (Sul, 2021). Concerning urdoxa alteration, what the above- 
mentioned researchers took to be the manifestation of urdoxa disturbance can be 
best understood as a disruption in habitual expectation. I discuss this shortly, in 2.3. 
and 3.3.
3. In accepted terms, “genetic phenomenology”.
4. In this paper, these associations bear the title of “affective syntheses” because they 
function affectively (Husserl, 2001, pp. 213-214, 420-421). As I detail it soon, these 
associations can constitute what they constitute only through affective propagation 
and affective repression.
5. (Husserl, 1973), pp.77
6. In non-phenomenological terms, this disturbance may correspond to selective atten-
tion impairment. Selective attention involves the operation that “prioritizes the 
process of a subset of available sensory inputs while suppressing the processing of 
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other inputs” (Gold et al., 2018, p. 1227, italics added). Given, in the instance of 
delusional mood, the usually unattended features of an object and/or its surrounding 
become prominent, the involved attentional impairment may be specified as 
a dysfunction in the bottom-up attentional control (Carr & Wale, 1986; DR. 
Hemsley, 1975; Gold et al., 2018).
7. This correlative subjective side abnormality has been described as “prolonged gazing” 
by Matussek (1987, p. 93) and, most recently, “hype-reflexivity” by Sass and Byrom 
(Sass & Byrom, 2015, p. 161). If the above analysis is correct, it can be reasonably 
postulated that such a subjective side abnormality and the perceptual object abnorm-
ality are two sides of the same coin. They are distinct interdependent moments of one 
and the same modal alteration, i.e., affective repression failure.
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